Bible-believing Christians throughout the country thought their freedom was most at risk" (Ostling 1984, 49; Carpenter 1988, 27, 44; Matthews 1992, 29, 40-47) . Evangelical broadcasts and revival crusades then expanded their numbers and institutional basis throughout the 1950s. Even so, in the 1960s Christian conservatives again found themselves out of step with many of the most vibrant domestic political developments of the day. The NAE and other conservative Protestant groups questioned the legitimacy of the Catholic John Kennedy's presidential candidacy, adding to their image as reactionary foes of a more pluralistic modern America (Silk 1989, 292; Matthews 1992, 138) . The fading of strident 1950s anti-communism with which conservative evangelists like McIntire and Billy James Hargis were identified (and Hargis's eventual discrediting via a sex scandal) also worked against a strong conservative Christian presence in public life (Pierard 1984, 163-65) .
Perhaps most importantly, few conservative evangelicals embraced the civil rights activism of the 1950s and 60s, and a number instead responded to school desegregation orders by creating new fundamentalist Christian academies that tended to be overwhelmingly white. From the 1960s to the 1990s, and especially with the advent of court-ordered bussing for desegregation in the 1970s, these schools would grow to onefifth of all private schools in the nation, with 90% of the conservative Christian private schools created after Brown v. Board of Education and nearly 40% located in the south (Cremin 1988 100; National Center for Education Statistics). Though these schools gradually became more racially diverse, they did so under governmental pressures that white conservative Christians resisted, as noted below. Partly as a result of civil rights tensions, black evangelicals formed what became the National Black Evangelical Association in the 1960s, officially with amicable relations with the NAE, but clearly without a strong sense of a shared agenda (Matthews 1992, 143) . As a result of these and related difficulties, the evangelical Christian right "was in a state of disarray" by the early 1970s (Pierard 1984, 169) .
II. The Birth of the "New Christian Right." At this juncture, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Roe v. Wade, an event sometimes regarded as pivotal in the rise of the New Christian Right (Brown 2002, 22) . It certainly cannot be denied that opposition to abortion figures centrally in New Christian Right agendas today. Also in this period, perhaps the most influential American liberal philosopher of the second half of the 20 th century, John Rawls, published A Theory of Justice, a work that gave elaborate philosophic expression to the egalitarian reform spirit of the 1960s. There Rawls argued that public institutions should be structured so that "the concept of right is prior to that of the good," a criterion that, it became clear as Rawls developed and modified his position, made it desirable for candidates and office-holders to avoid advocating religious views. 2 Some writers suggest that at a deeper level, the "emerging movements in Protestant and Catholic circles" that sought to return religion to the public square arose in reaction to the spread in American culture of these sorts of liberal political and philosophic views, which they saw as dismissive and repressive of religious perspectives (Skillen 1998, 57, 61, 68- 74; see also Carter 1993, 54-58, 216 ).
2 Rawls 1971, 31, 216; 1987, 5, 20 (where Rawls claims that "no one any longer supposes that a practicable political conception for a constitutional regime can rest on a shared devotion to the Catholic or the Protestant Faith, or to any other religious view" and contends that comprehensive "claims of religion and philosophy" should be "excluded" as "a condition of establishing a shared basis for free public reason"); 1999 150, 174-75 (where Rawls contends that public reason involves a "duty of civility" that means political candidates should not seek to ensure the "influence and success" of their religious views).
But though for some, both Roe and Rawls would become symbols of how modern secular elites disregard traditional religious values, few would suggest that the New Christian Right arose directly due to mass popular outrage with modern Rawlsian liberal doctrines, or even cognate legal advocacy by the ACLU and other organizations. More surprisingly, liberal evangelical Randall Balmer has recently argued that when Roe was decided, "the vast majority of evangelical leaders said virtually nothing," while "many of those who did comment," such as W. A. Criswell, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Dallas and former president of the Southern Baptist Convention, "actually applauded the decision" (Balmer 2006, 12) . Balmer notes that at a 1990 conference, veteran Christian Right activist Paul Weyrich stated that he had "utterly failed" to prompt mass evangelical political involvement over the issues of school prayer and abortion, as well as the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (Balmer 2006, 14-15) .
But if not the school prayer or abortion decisions or more general liberal intellectual and cultural trends, what, then, spurred modern New Christian Right political and legal mobilization? Weyrich contended that Christian Right organizing began to take off in the mid-1970s, when the Internal Revenue Service tried to deny Christian schools "tax-exempt status" to schools perceived as engaging in racial discrimination (Balmer 2006, 14-15) . Steven Brown quotes Jerry Falwell as similarly saying that it was the IRS's new policy on tax exemption that "made us realize that we had to fight for our lives" (Brown 2002, 23) . That level of anxiety may seem somewhat inexplicable, since many evangelical Christian groups had nothing like the Bob Jones ban on interracial dating. But many favored fellow believers in hiring, had conservative religious content in their education programs, adhered to traditional gender roles, and had other practices that, they feared, might be viewed by secular liberals as a basis for removing the sorts of government privileges they had long possessed. To be sure, a broad and internally diverse movement such as the New Christian Right is never caused by any single factor.
Still, it seems fair to say that, just as the National Association of Evangelicals first coalesced around an effort to preserve access to the public airwaves for their profitable programming, at least one major source of concerted political action by modern New Christian Right groups was their desire to maintain governmental policies that helped them to finance their schools and many of their other institutions.
Significantly for the development of this new political and legal activism, that goal did not easily lend itself to any claim of privileged status for religious institutions, much less Christian ones. When the Internal Revenue Service adopted the new tax exemption policy to which Weyrich and Falwell referred, it did so in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions underlining that federal, state, and local tax exemptions could not be provided to religious groups per se. In the leading case, Walz v. Tax Commission (397 U.S. 664 [1970] ), Chief Justice Warren Burger did rule, with only Justice William Douglas in dissent, that the New York City Tax Commission had acted constitutionally in granting property tax exemptions to "religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship" (666). Burger noted that all fifty states had tax exemptions for places of worship, most by constitutional guarantees, and that the federal income tax had also always not applied to churches, part of an unbroken pattern of congressionally authorized exemptions that went back to the nation's origins (676).
He stressed, however, that churches received these exemptions not as "churches as such." They were part of a "broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups," all deemed "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life" (673). Burger acknowledged that churches varied greatly in the extent of the social welfare programs or other "good works" they undertook, but he thought that for that very reason, government should not seek to evaluate the worth of each church's particular social welfare efforts. To do so would be a source of extensive "day-to-day" involvements and potential "confrontations" between religious groups and government agencies that the First Amendment sought to minimize (674).
The upshot was that all churches could continue to receive this exemption, as they had throughout U.S. history; but they did so as socially beneficial nonprofit organizations, not because religion could be "specially promoted" by government. As Justice Brennan noted in concurring, the Court held only that "government may properly include religious institutions among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society" (689).
On the question of just how religious groups contributed to public life, there were differences in the reasoning of Burger, Brennan, and obviously Douglas in dissent; but all three plainly agreed that the tax exemption would have been much more questionable if it had not extended equally to a wide range of other socially beneficial nonprofits.
Christian conservatives and all other religious groups therefore must have realized that they were far more likely to maintain their tax exemptions, winning support from judges and secular non-profit organizations, if they did not seek any exclusive or special treatment for religious bodies. They needed instead to present themselves as meriting the same status as other socially beneficial groups.
That conclusion was reinforced by a number of Supreme Court decisions over the next three years, both favorable and unfavorable to religious litigants. The favorable cases included the upholding of direct federal grants to religiously-affiliated colleges and universities in Connecticut (Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 [1971] ) and a decision sustaining a South Carolina law that authorized a state agency to issue tax-exempt revenue bonds to assist in financing capital construction by higher educational institutions, including a Baptist-controlled college (Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 [1973] ). Although in each case the Court perpetuated its historical pattern of approving most forms of governmental financial aid to religious institutions, it did stress that the institutions in question all served "secular education goals" and were not "pervasively sectarian" (Hunt v. McNair, . Again the lesson was that religious institutions were more likely to sustain their privileges if they stressed the contributions they made in common with non-religious organizations, rather than claiming any special status.
Beginning with Lemon v. Kurzman (403 U.S. 602, 614 [1971] ), moreover, the Court embarked on a series of decisions through the 1970s that struck down many forms of financial aid for parochial schools, now seen as involving the sorts of "excessive entanglement" between church and state that Walz had held to be forbidden by the establishment clause.
3 These cases largely involved Catholic schools, and they did not spark any conservative Protestant political mobilizations. But they did reinforce lawyerly awareness that public programs seen as aids to religion were likely to be viewed by modern judges far more critically than they had been in most of America's past. contributions in the case of any private schools that practiced racial discrimination. They could not be viewed as "charitable" institutions, for they operated "contrary to declared
Federal public policy," as embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court recognized that "the promotion of a healthy pluralism" was one purpose of the tax exemption, but it held that the "declared Federal public policy against support for racial discrimination" overrode "any assertion of value in practicing private racial discrimination, whether ascribed to philosophical pluralism or divine inspiration" (33).
Though the schools challenged in the case were not religious institutions, the court discussed the recent Walz ruling, holding that it did not prevent interpreting the First Amendment "in harmony with" the post-Civil War Amendments by requiring even religious institutions receiving the "indirect economic benefit" of tax exemption to operate in accord with federal opposition to racial segregation (52-55).
With this ruling, and with conservative Christian schools proliferating just as many federal courts were imposing aggressive desegregation orders, it was inevitable that (Martin 1996, 168-73; Turner 1997, 226-27; Balmer 2006, xvi, 14-16) .
The University fought the IRS decision in court, winning at the district level, losing on appeal at the circuit court level, and then appealing to the Supreme Court. But though these efforts contributed to the first major mobilization of the New Christian For the Christian Legal Society lawyers, the Bob Jones case represented a challenge to the preferred litigation approach they were developing, a challenge they proved unable to meet to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court. From early on, informed by the Walz opinions and the school cases, they generally sought to argue that religious groups should have "equal access" to public programs and institutions, including tax exemptions for all publicly beneficial nonprofit organizations (Brown 2002, 69; Casey 2006, 7) . But the IRS policy denied access equally to all racially discriminatory groups; so their brief stressed instead that the policy unduly burdened the free exercise of sincere religious beliefs and thereby threatened all religious practices (Center for Law and Religious Freedom 1981, 4-11) . It added that Congress had not directly authorized the IRS to deny tax exemptions on this basis and that religious freedoms should not be impaired on the basis of inference (13). Justice Rehnquist's dissent agreed with the second argument--but like all the other justices, he accepted that Congress could deny religious groups the exemption on these grounds if it did so decide, rejecting the claim that the free exercise clause gave them any special constitutional privileges in this regard Mergens, 496 U.S. 248 (1990) . Since the passage of the Equal Access Act, conservative
Christians have gone on to organize thousands of new student Bible groups that meet in public schools. But in an example of why many conservatives are dissatisfied with the "equal treatment" approach, the Act has most recently been invoked chiefly on behalf of gay and lesbian student groups (Hacker 2005, 17-18, 24-27; ReligiousTolerance, 2007 ).
Yet out of a combination of principle and pragmatism, the leading New Christian Right litigation groups have since adhered overwhelming to "equal treatment" approaches to both establishment and free exercise issues. In 1982, former CLS lawyer John W. Whitehead founded the second major Christian litigation body, the Rutherford
Institute. It has sought aggressively to initiate lawsuits broadening religious freedom rather than waiting for hostile governmental actions, in keeping with Whitehead's philosophy of Christian activism. But from the outset, Whitehead has championed religious free expression not as specially privileged, only as a part of broad and equal liberties for all expression, professing not to aim "to have a Christian nation, but to enable religious people to survive" (Lienesch 1993, 167, 187-90; Brown 2002, 32-35 (Brown 2002, 36; Hacker 2005, 21-23) . In Mergens and subsequent cases, Sekulow and the ACLJ have consistently argued that religious groups are entitled to a "place at the table," but that free expression also extends to "the Satanists and the Nazis," despite predictable objections from others in the New Christian Right (Hacker 2005, 25) .
It seems likely that, scarred by the defeat of distinctive free exercise claims in Bob Jones University and many other cases of the 1980s involving organizational financial interests, most of those shaping New Christian Right litigation in the past quarter-century have concluded that they would risk losing essential protections if they undertook more militant litigation strategies, claiming privileges for Christian groups or even for religious groups that others could be denied. 5 Their concerns for "institutional maintenance" required them to adopt arguments that could actually win in court, especially since conservative Christians found they could not always rely on promised support elsewhere (Ivers 1992, 247, 265) . Despite their enthusiasm for Reagan, many
Christian Right activists felt that his administration provided them relatively little in the way of concrete improvements either in public policy or assistance for their institutions during the 1980s (Pierard 1984, 170; Lienesch 1993, 14) . The aggressive lobbying tactics pursued by Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority also seemed to generate more controversy than benefits, and he dissolved his organization in 1989, though Pat
Robertson created the Christian Coalition the same year to carry similar efforts forward.
But even as Christian conservatives experienced disappointments in other political arenas, equal treatment arguments were providing protection and some new gains for religious groups both in establishment and free exercise judicial decisions. So while the New Christian Right's focus on electoral and legislative activities did not vanish, many in the movement came to agree that they should devote more energy to winning in court. Not only did older groups like the NAE begin to litigate more often in the 1980s; toward the end of the decade, new conservative Christian litigation groups began to proliferate rapidly (Ivers 1992, 255-56; Hacker 2005, 7-9 Staver founded Liberty Counsel, now associated with Falwell, which has also stressed free expression arguments, rather than specifically religious free exercise claims, in its litigation (Brown 2002, 55, 58; Hacker 2005, 39-41 In part due to controversies surrounding its initial leader, Alan Sears, the ADF has never succeeded in playing that role. Still, it has provided numerous grants to Christian litigators, striving to insure that New Christian Right activists file in every Supreme
Court case on religion, as they have done unfailingly since 1990 (Brown 2002, 41-52) . free exercise should both be construed to facilitate specifically "religious liberty," often through giving religious groups "special treatment" in the form of "accommodations" not provided others (McConnell 1985, 3, 5) . Five years later in a major Harvard Law Review article, McConnell contended that the free exercise clause could plausibly be interpreted as compelling "exemptions" for religious groups from "generally applicable laws," although he did hold that "religious" associations included groups concerned to raise doubts about religion (McConnell 1990 (McConnell , 1415 (McConnell -1416 . In these years McConnell was also becoming a favorite attorney for the Christian Legal Society and other conservative
IV. The Qualified Triumphs of "Equal
Christian groups (Brown 2002, 27, 66) .
But the same year McConnell published his free exercise argument, the Supreme Court delivered a devastating blow to efforts to win constitutionally privileged status for religious groups in Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (494 U.S. 872
[1990]). Two members of the Native American Church sued to obtain unemployment benefits denied them by the state when they were fired from their jobs at a private drug rehabilitation center after their employers learned that they regularly used peyote as part of Native American Church ceremonies. Because few among the New Christian Right identified with these religious claims to drug use, no New Christian Right litigators participated in the case (Brown 2002, 77) . But Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a bare majority of the Court, not only refused to limit the state's powers to deny benefits to consumers of illegal drugs. He also denied that any "individual's religious beliefs" could ever "excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law" (878-89). Scalia also argued that free exercise claims should only receive "strict scrutiny" protection, with the Court determining if burdensome laws are justified as necessary for "compelling"
governmental interests, when they were combined with other constitutional protections, "such as freedom of speech and press" (881). The landmark case in this regard is generally seen to be Rosenberger v. The
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (515 U.S. 819 [1995] ). The University of Virginia had denied to a new evangelical Christian student group, Wide Awake Productions, aid from the University's student activity fund. Michael McConnell argued on behalf of the students that their religious speech was entitled to "equal status" with non-religious speakers, such as gay rights groups (McConnell 1995, 5-7) . For the majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy similarly treated the issue as fundamentally one of free speech for all, not protection for religious free exercise (828-29). Given that it was a 5-4 decision, the case probably could not have been won by arguments stressing special religious claims. Subsequently, McConnell argued before Congress and in some of his scholarship for "equal rights of expression" for religious and non-religious speakers, foregoing explicit advocacy of the sorts of distinctive free exercise claims he had previously favored (McConnell 1998, 38) .
In the wake of Rosenberger, arguments stressing equal treatment, equal access, and free speech then won a series of further, often closely contested victories for public aid to religious schools, a cause that increasingly brought evangelical Protestants and their modern academies into alliance with Catholic institutions they had historically . It did not matter that the institutions might be seen as "pervasively sectarian" so long as they served the community's educational objectives.
Representing the petitioners, Michael McConnell argued that religious groups were entitled to "receive their fair share of neutrally available public funds" for such services, without having "to secularize their own speech as the price of receiving equal treatment."
Even so, his brief firmly rejected any claim of privileged status for religion. It stated that "the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from expending money for religious purposes; it prohibits targeting public subsidies to religious groups, discriminating in their favor, or endorsing their messages; and it prohibits the government itself from promoting religion by supplying materials or personnel that advance indoctrinating messages" (McConnell et al., 1999, 15) . Esbeck, a law professor at the University of Missouri, sent draft legislation to conservative Christian Senator John Ashcroft designed to insure that "faith based organizations" could receive federal funds to provide welfare services (Esbeck 1998, 21-22; Sider 2005, 485-89) . Those organizations were, moreover, to include not only social service bodies associated with religious groups. Congregations themselves were also to be eligible to receive federal grants, so that churches too small to have affiliated nonprofits could still get assistance for their direct charitable work (Minow 2003, 12) .
Supported by New Christian Right advocates like the Christian Legal Society, the idea, deemed "charitable choice," caught on quickly (Casey 2006, 8) abandoning, at least in court, the aspirations that many have had to, in Jerry Falwell's words, "return America to her religious heritage" as a Christian nation (Brown 2002, 35, 78, 100; Hacker 2005, 2-4, 9) . More than these authors, I have stressed how New Christian Right leaders have felt compelled to do so in order to protect the funding systems and organizations that are the life's blood of their existence. But I also agree with these authors that as a result, many New Christian Right leaders feel they are failing to achieve the kinds of change they really want (Brown 2002, 4, 118, 142; Hacker 2005, 7-9) . By the same token, we might conclude that fears of the rise of premillennialist Christians to dominance in American life can be laid to rest, for all efforts to give extraordinary privileges to religions in general, much less to these forms of evangelical Christianity, are bound to have too little political and judicial support to succeed.
That is indeed my conclusion; but let me acknowledge a couple of points that may appear to tell in the other direction. First, as religious groups accumulate victories using equal access and free expression arguments, they also are acquiring a wide range of concrete forms of governmental assistance. There is something to these arguments; and let me note that in the late 1990s, I
expressed strong worries that New Christian Right advocates would win public funding via equal treatment arguments in establishment clause cases, while also winning preferred position status for their religious groups in free exercise cases, thereby ending up, on balance, unduly privileged (Smith 1998) . Currently, however, I do not find any of these concerns as significant as the New Christian Right's relinquishing of efforts to argue openly either in court or in legislative processes for a privileged status for religion in American life. As Henriques acknowledges and as the case law shows, for better or worse, most of the forms of governmental aid now being upheld have existed throughout U.S. history. In some cases, recent measures simply represent restoration of past privileges, and those that go beyond the past do not appear thus far to be fuelling any major expansion of New Christian Right organizations or activities. Their most vital financial resource remains religious broadcasting, and even their broadcasting is constrained by concerns to maintain their non-partisan, tax exempt status (Brown 2002, 125 ).
In sum, whatever their deepest aspirations, nothing in recent litigation, legislation, or social experience suggests that New Christian Right groups are likely to succeed in displacing secular social service providers, community groups, or broadcasters in law, public policies, or in social practices, only that they will exist alongside them within a highly pluralistic society. If Justices Scalia and Kennedy are any indication, the presence of Catholics on the high court is unlikely to alter those circumstances. Both have been very receptive to equal treatment and free speech arguments in religion cases, but both have frequently voted to reject claims made in the name of religious free exercise alone.
Scalia is in fact the Court's most persistent champion of relatively minimal scrutiny of alleged burdens on free exercise. And though Catholics and Protestant evangelicals may be able to converge on arguments for giving religious groups "a place at the table" and on access to public funds for their schools, their notions of the Christianity that should prevail in a "Christian America" remain very different. 
